Defensive weapons and star wars: a supergame with optimal punishments

We model the perspective faced by nuclear powers involved in a supergame where nuclear deterrence is used to stabilise peace. This setting allows us to investigate the bearings of defensive weapons on the effectiveness of deterrence and peace stability, relying on one-shot optimal punishments. We find that the sustainability of peace is unaffected by defensive shields if the latter are symmetric across countries, while asymmetric endowments of such weapons have clear-cut destabilising consequences.     

YN／变压器负序电流和谐波电流的分析

考虑二相负荷大小、功率因数变化,分析了ＹＮ／联结平衡变压器用于铁道牵引电站时一次侧的负序和谐波电流的变化规律。通过与ＹＮ／△接线变压器比较,说明ＹＮ／联结平衡变压器在减小电网负序和谐波电流方面具有很大优势。在牵引电站中使用该变压器能显著地提高牵引供电系统的技术和经济性能。     

Missile Strategy in a Post-Nuclear Age

While the arrival of nuclear weapons coincided roughly with the development of short, medium, intermediate, and eventually intercontinental missiles, the contribution of missile technology to the deterrence equation is often lost. If nuclear weapons were eliminated, even new generation missiles with conventional payloads could struggle to render effective deterrence. But some of the physical and psychological effects commonly ascribed to nuclear weapons could still be in play. And in a world without nuclear weapons, thinking about the use and control of force from the nuclear age would also deserve renewed attention.     

正反向量子斯特林循环有限时间热力学性能界限和优化准则

研究了正反向量子斯特林循环的最优性能.在经典极限下,导出了循环的有限时间热力学性能界限和优化准则.得到了斯特林热机、制冷机和热泵特性参数之间的优化关系.     

Choosing the Right Sidekick: Economic Complements to US Military Grand Strategies

ABSTRACT

Scholars and practitioners of grand strategy agree that the use of military force should be supplemented by appropriate economic policies. However, strangely few accounts of economic complements to military grand strategies have been presented in recent discourse on US grand strategy. This paper takes a first step to fill this information gap. I first assess the role that could be played by economic measures under two types of grand strategies – one focusing on the balance of power and the other emphasising influence and order. Second, I introduce what I call ‘the influence-capability dilemma’ and discuss tradeoffs in adopting certain economic policies in order to help the US sustain pre-eminence in the international system. Third, I discuss how the US should address this dilemma of economic means in dealing with the rising China.     

某特种车辆TTCAN网络的静态调度设计

针对某特种车辆计算机控制系统对实时性的高要求,采用了TTCAN总线系统,为实现TTCAN系统的静态调度问题,提出了基于AL算法的改进算法——谐波周期算法,并通过MATLAB建立了系统的调度表。针对谐波周期算法的不足,结合该计算机控制系统的工作原理、信息传输的重要程度对静态调度表进行了适当的修改。通过与AL算法的对比分析,证实了改进的谐波周期算法在保证系统中周期型消息实时性能前提下,为非周期型信息获得了更大的传输带宽,又使系统信息传输的时间分配更加合理。     

一种鲁棒的场地球类视频中的球门探测方法

在场地球类视频中,球门常常会伴随着精彩片段而出现。因此,球门探测是体育视频的基础,同时也是视频高层语义概念探测的研究热点。目前,利用机器学习方法进行视频中的对象探测是非常有前途的研究领域。基于此,提出一种基于模糊决策树的球门探测算法,用来探测场地球类视频中球门帧的出现,为了提高分类准确性,在模糊决策树训练的过程中加入了平衡处理。实验结果表明,与基于阈值和决策树的算法相比,该算法可以得到更好的分类结果(F-measure>95%),并且我们可以从所建立的树中推导出模糊规则来解释分类模型。     

Nicholas John Spykman,the Balance of Power,and International Order

Nicholas John Spykman was probably America’s finest geopolitical theorist of the twentieth century, even though he was an active participant over the course only of five years (1938–43). He is rightly viewed as a worthy intellectual successor to Sir Halford Mackinder in Britain. Spykman originated the (Eurasian) Rimland concept, which is of continuing political and strategic utility today. He was controversial and notably outspoken while his writings make it quite clear that his concern with the acquisition of power was contextualised by serious concerns for world order.     

条（环）状干摩擦阻尼器的微滑移数值模型

提出一种求解弹性条(环)状阻尼器微滑移接触运动的数值方法。将阻尼器和外部激励历程在空间和时间上离散,将相同数量的干摩擦触点布置于离散阻尼器上;把接触运动判据应用到各离散接触点,确定其运动状态并修正刚度矩阵,求解整个阻尼器的平衡方程。该方法避免了有限元软件求解含摩擦接触问题的迭代过程,从而保证了求解的可执行性。同时,克服了微滑移模型理论解法对法向载荷分布规律及载荷时变性的限制,为求解具有局部性以及时变性的法向载荷的结构动态响应提供了更为精确的边界条件,从而可提高结构频响分析的准确性。应用多谐波平衡法分别计算宏滑移和微滑移阻尼器约束下的结构动态响应,发现在结构减振中,微滑移模型能够适应更宽范围的法向力。     

Evolutionary determinants of war

This paper considers evolutionarily stable decisions about whether to initiate violent conflict rather than accepting a peaceful sharing outcome. Focusing on small sets of players such as countries in a geographically confined area, we use the concept of evolutionary stability in finite populations. We find that players’ evolutionarily stable preferences widen the range of peaceful resource allocations that are rejected in favor of violent conflict, compared to the Nash equilibrium outcomes. Relative advantages in fighting strength are reflected in the equilibrium set of peaceful resource allocations.